Albert Einstein once said that the "definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." For a modern example, witness the trial of the Texas-based Holy Land Foundation (HLF), once the largest Muslim-American charity and the latest bellweather for the US Justice Department's legal pursuit of alleged supporters and sponsors of terror.

In the past few weeks, both supporters and detractors slowly came to the realization that the high-profile court case might collapse. And as expected (even if no one expected how), District Judge Joe Fish declared a mistrial in the case this week, leaving defendants jubilant. Prosecutors were left to contemplate why what they thought was a surefire case became just another in a string of lackluster - and failed - anti-terror cases brought against Muslim-Americans and US-based Muslim charities. With so much experience behind them, they should have known better.

From the early days of the trial, there were signs of shakiness from within a prosecution egged on by zealous opponents of the HLF. As in previous cases, the prosecution overwhelmed the jury with circumstantial evidence (much of it related to the linking of 300 "unindicted co-conspirators") and hoped for an aggregate impression of guilt in the minds of jurors. Courtroom onlookers noted looks of confusion on faces in the jury, and further news of behind-the-scenes drama in deliberations (rumor had it that one juror refused to vote) resulted in Judge Fish issuing an "Allen charge" in order to pressure jurors to reach a verdict. By this time, prosecutors feared the worst.

In the end, most of the jury didn't accept the charges and many verdicts were not rendered (the mistrial itself was due to the recall of the otherwise unanimous verdict by two jurors). "I thought they were not guilty across the board," commented juror William Neal. "There was so little evidence." Two of the Holy Land Foundation's leaders, Shukri Abu Baker and Ghassan Elashi, had no decision made on a collective 69 charges made against them, while the remaining defendants were found not guilty on 93 of 96 charges - though the mistrial declaration ironically wiped out 62 of those not-guilty verdicts.

Part of the reason why guilty verdicts were so hard to come by is because the prosecution attempted to argue that moral support for the Palestinian people in certain areas where Hamas operates is "effective support" for terrorist acts committed by that group. But even though recent history showed the futility of this approach - witness the extensive and expensive trial against Sami al-Arian, which had similar results - prosecutors may not have had a choice, since there was never a "smoking gun" that directly connected any of the named individuals with actual acts of terrorism. By overreaching yet again, the case was almost certainly doomed from the start.

Theoretically, a mistrial means that the case can be tried again with the hope of reaching a unanimous verdict. But the mistrial outcome obscures the fact that not a single "guilty" verdict was offered, which does not bode well for a future conviction. As in previous terror-related cases, the prosecution showed all their cards for the Holy Land trial, which leaves the defense with a significant advantage in finding weaknesses in any future case, which - barring new information coming to light - will have to be prosecuted the same way.

Beyond this, the Holy Land trial involved more than just the five indicted men - namely the hundreds of so-called "unindicted co-conspirators" publicly named in the case in order to allow hearsay and to create the impression of a vast Muslim-American conspiracy to support terror. After struggling to understand exactly what that status means (other than a stain on reputations), those named - include ISNA, CAIR, and other Muslim-American groups - are continuing their efforts to find legal means to remove their names from the list. Despite being accused of conspiring with individuals who have now been de-facto vindicated of nearly 200 charges, much public relations damage has already been done.

The first time a Muslim or Islamic charity was acquitted (or convicted of technicalities), pundits brushed it off as an anomaly. With a few more failed attempts, some grumbled about gullible jurors or the ineffectiveness of the court. Now with the Holy Land case all but written off, many should pause to consider the efficacy of current anti-terror strategy. But if recent history is any judge, the Holy Land case will be followed by similar indictments (and un-indictments) with sketchy evidence and familiar results. Sadly, the insanity is set to continue.

http://www.dallasnews.com/video/dallasnews/hp/index.html?nvid=185986&she=1

Interview with juror in case.