Historically, crisis cults emerge in societies whose ideological, structural, social and cultural mores are increasingly unable to meet the needs of their people. The uncertainty borne out of these pervasive failures are indeed what crisis cults cater to. If the Lal Masjid debacle can be considered a festering sore on the already ailing body of the Pakistani nation, the anthropological lens of "crisis cults" provides a useful framework for diagnosing the core issues that have led to the evolution of such a bewildering phenomenon. According to anthropologists, a "crisis cult" is "a group reaction to a crisis, chronic or acute, that is cultic... where the crisis is a deeply felt frustration or basic problem with which routine methods secular or sacred cannot cope" and the "cultic" is the inability to accept any feedback that disrupts the myth of the cult or the appetite of individuals to believe.

The rhetoric used by two Maulanas, the now deceased Ghazi Abdul Rashid and the arrested Abdul Aziz, provides important clues in this regard. Both brothers as well as Umme Hassan, the female principal of Jamia Hafsa, pepper nearly every speech and media interview with a reminder of how the Pakistani state is failing the poor man. Their demand is a simple one: an Islamic system for Pakistan, a country created in the name of Islam. This is a great tactic. In the simplicity of their rhetoric, the leadership of Lal Masjid has captured succinctly the burgeoning crisis that is at the root of the "deeply held frustration" that anthropologists associate with crisis cults.

Indeed, the identity crisis that feeds this "deeply held frustration" is one that was created by revisionist history and nationalistic myths that the Pakistani population has been constantly fed for the last sixty years. Whether it is historically incorrect textbooks that propagate myths about the inherently religious nature of the struggle for independence or ludicrous beliefs regarding the character of Pakistani territory as originally Muslim since the time of the Holy Prophet (pbuh), the beastly confusion and manipulation manifests itself again and again in myriad ways.

The current military administration has contributed to promoting and manipulating the current identity crisis. The Women's Protection Bill was celebrated as a victory against religious conservatives. In reality, with appeasements such as making fornication and adultery a crime under the Pakistan Penal Code, the Bill did nothing to assuage the central question that plagues Pakistani nation identity: what exactly is the relationship between Islam and Pakistan and between the state and the citizen? Is Pakistan a secular or a sacred state?

This question has been answered with sly simplicity by the leaders of the Lal Masjid campaign. For them, things are quite simple: Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and so all else must be abandoned and an Islamic system reinstated. In coupling the practice of their simplistic formula with the highly dramatized theatrics of vigilante justice and insuring themselves media attention by employing the seductive morality of cracking down on sexual licentiousness, the two Maulanas assisted by the formidable Umme Hassan, have tapped into the" deeply held frustration" increasingly ignored by both the military and the secular democratic forces in the country.

The chronological significance of the emergence of the Lal Masjid campaign is also worth drawing attention to. The military, once dutifully revered and feared by most Pakistani citizens, has muddied its uniform by its unglamorous foray into the always-messy realm of politics. Forced to play power games that involve popularity rather than security, the past few months have seen President Pervez Musharraf and the military administration increasingly preoccupied with manoeuvres designed not to defend territorial boundaries but rather to co-opt political enemies. The need and pressure of co-option has become so intense with the suspension of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and consequent constitutional crisis that the Army's reputation as an arbiter of stability has become increasingly questionable.

Similarly, the promise of "real" democracy also bears little hope for the ordinary Pakistani. The supposedly national political parties, recently so incensed over the suspension of the Chief Justice and so ardently committed to his reinstatement, promise little better in terms of resolving either the incipient identity crisis or providing any meaningful expectation of structural change. At best they retain conveniently "democratic" facades for oligarchic landowners, clan leaders and urban industrialists who use established relationships of patronage to pledge support to a national leader. The same faces and figures are recycled before a wearied nation left hapless after ruined experiments with both authoritarian and democratic governments.

Enter the Lal Mosque, a new voice markedly different from that of the usual suspects and promising a utopic society where moral order prevails and justice is accessible. Their emergence and perseverance on the national scene signifies both the presence of a gaping political chasm and the inability of old power figures to respond to the frustrations of an increasingly poor, disillusioned and young Pakistani public. If the opportunistic chronology and festering identity issues are combined, the case is compelling and typifies exactly the "deeply felt frustration and basic problem with routine methods" invoked by the definition of crisis cults at the beginning of our discussion.

If the existence of a "crisis" is thus taken for granted, then we must move on to whether the Lal Masjid's modus operandi can truly be described as "cultic". Both the iconography and the simplistic rhetoric employed by the Maulana brothers at the helm of the movement suggest a cultic character pivoted on the charisma of the leadership and the isolation of members from the larger society.

Videotapes of Jamia Hafsa show women dressed in their now iconic niqabi burqas, increasingly rapturous in their pleas to the Divine and committed to their isolation in the name of reinstating an Islamic order. Their vigilante behaviour is also typical of cultic groups which often require daring feats of members as a means of proving their commitment to the cause. The raids on video shops, the kidnappings of alleged prostitutes, the forcible occupation of property and now holding students hostage, all suggest a mentality that perceives the members of the group as "good" and the larger society as irreparably errant and misguided. Finally, the unfailing belief among students of Jamia Hafsa that their "sacrifices" would actually result in the establishment of an Islamic system as well as their obstinate allegiance to death for their cause, both demonstrate a distortion of reality that is typical of cults.

If Lal Masjid can indeed be described as a crisis cult, the following questions are raised: What juncture have we as a nation reached when suicide cults inhabit our capital and defiantly claim jurisdiction over Government property? What depths of despair have the destitute women and orphan children been reduced to when entering an extremist movement represents a respite from the harshness of day to day existence? What level of ignorance has our understanding of Islam fallen to such that the most marginal and extremist allusion to faith immediately garners thousands of followers?

As Pakistanis sift through the psychological, social and political debris left by the Lal Masjid crisis they must ponder these questions carefully. Crisis cults emerge in societies whose ideological, structural, social and cultural mores are increasingly unable to meet the needs of their people. True, their solutions are vacuous, misguided and cruel in the exploitation of those who chose to fall for them but the danger lies not simply in the solution that they offer but rather the deep festering crises that they represent.

Six decades have passed since the creation of Pakistan. There have been many experiments both with democracy and with authoritarianism � indeed as a nation, Pakistan has become used to both crisis and uncertainty. Yet if the Lal Masjid debacle and the innocent lives that it has claimed is to mean anything at all, it is time to grapple with questions that have been ignored for nearly sixty years. The most basic among these questions is this: who is Pakistan as a nation and why indeed was it created?

I don't see the harm in admitting the deep rooted failings in muslim social structures. Today there are partitions between developmental India and dictator run and anti-secular Pakistan/Bangladesh. We cannot deny that muslims take an increasingly isolated and regressive approach to politics. And all done in the name of Islam too. So why place on ourselves the burden of empires past when we can have a vision of social development for the future? Nothing stops us from acting effectively except acting effectively. Its the all or nothing crowd. If people aren't compelled to be in purdah and if non-muslims aren't forced to pay a tribute ... then muslims cannot have the Blessing of Allah to take our role as middle nation and enhancers of humanity? Are we so naive to play the blame game between violent factions (asigning blame as always to the least muslim looking person in the room) and not develop our own civil institutions that integrate us? Is it always the all or nothing?

Returning to subject of the article:

I do not see why the author does not make the obvious to early 1930s Germany. We must be students of history... similar circumstances exist in Pakistan. There is not easily villified minority like Jews, so these misguided people turn to militant Islam.

All it took was the spark of a charismatic leader to ignite so many people.

Pakistan right now is fighting to see if it is secular or religious. Unfortunately the majority, ie the uneducated masses, tend towards a religious state. Thus, elections would be disastrous.

Make no mistake. Musharraf and his colleagues, real or merely in ideology are all that stands between fundamentalists and nuclear technology. America, India, and the world in general cannot allow his regime to fall.

The question on secular vs. religious state is not for this or even the next generation. The question of the moment is fundamentalist or moderate.

To address the authors last question, I would say Pakistan was created out of sheer idiocy, spurred on by convoluted British econopolitics. Its creation was a trauma that will take generations yet to recover from for India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (East Pak let us not forget).

But in general I am with Noam: "Everybody's worried about stopping terrorism. Well, there's a really easy way: stop participating in it."

Ghulam: good post, it should not be all or nothing, Muslims in Pakistan and Bangladesh on their part must get over our Hindu phobia and India phobia, but it is very hard to do considering prevailing situation in India. But we should not stop trying and I believe India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are all officially getting more engaged with increased dialogue, trade and bus/train links etc. This must continue and people to people contact should be increased as much as possible through these channels. Having said that as long as there are incidents like Gujarat, repression in Kashmir and economic discrimination of Muslims in India, we cannot trust India's intentions and for that we need to balance India's threat with China's involvement in our countries in not just economic sphere but in strategic defensive alliance.

China has its own Muslim problem in Xinjiang which they need to address. Chinese economy is growing and the Chinese are a pragmatic people, so when they see the importance of Chinese/Muslim-world relation and Xinjiang's negative effect on this relation, they will mend their ways and give Uighur's more freedom to practice and safeguard their culture, religion, language etc.

I agree with you that extremism and fundamentalism is not traditional Islam that we inherited from our forefathers, it is an offshoot of Kharijite, Taimya, Wahhabi, Moududi, Hassan al Banna, Syed Qutb, Nabhani traditions and their offshoots, but this is another subject that is worth another book. We need to reconnect with our traditional Islam and adapt it to the present world and throw away these "Islamist" modern innovations from the half intellectuals and pseudo leaders above. And our westernized brain-washed secular elite need to understand these matters more to become one with our masses most of whom are still following our inherited old and traditional Islam. Jihadist and Islamists are a product of CIA, ISI and Wahhabi oil money and we need to bring them back to the fold of real Islam. This cannot be done by secular leaders, it is only possible under progressive and futuristic real Islamic leaders (not "moderate/secular muslims" who are essentially Western puppets) who follow the middle way of our prophet Muhammad (SAW).

I sincerely appreciate such well balanced opinions that Ghulam expressed and Khilji seconded. The point I was making was very simple - the larger Muslim populace needs to understand what the smaller intellectual part of Islam had always understood - as is evident from the well thought out opinions expressed here.

All of my interaction with Islam or Hindu has been with people who just wanted to work and live in peace. What upsets this peaceful apple cart is an occasional fall back to historical glory or suffering. That cannot be helped, it is a part of human nature.

It is expected of Hindus to remember past hurts and it is expected of Muslims to think this is all big lie! Just as it is expected of Blacks in America to think of slavery "after so much time has gone by" as the whites may feel, and it is expected of the whites to say 'it really was not all that bad!'

The crucial difference is what the intellectuals feel and do to address the past. What is needed in Islam is a significant minority of liberals who can influence the the larger population to come to grips with the past and liberalize Islamic thought. Denial and political correctness rule the roost today.

Much as large sections of Christians have come to understand that fascism and 'divinity of the church' are the same idea, (and this is the reason why they don't adhere to religion as assiduously as the church may want them to), some day Islamic liberals will get the following they lack today.

Muslims are going through a period in history which is similar to well chronicled events in Christianity. Just as you all think I am a bigot for pointing out why Muslims have a heavy burden of proof, so also people must have accused those who pointed out the atrocities that the Church carried out in the name of 'saving souls'.

So, I will do my insignificant bit and that too will come to pass as a part of history which repeats itself.

>> What is needed in Islam is a significant minority of liberals who can influence the the larger population to come to grips with the past and liberalize Islamic thought.

Islamic thought IS liberalizing. I think that what's lacking is Muslim will and the assistance of the tide of globalisation that has instead been sweeping away all real spiritual and social awareness in a wave of materialism and the western pecking order. We see the bright colours of the benefactors of western advancement, but what about all the human fodder that has been going into this machine? Look at most of Africa, South America and Asia (including many non-muslim states) that stay in check ... these nations suffer.

What the west and the Ummah needs is not a global Muslim community that will follow in their footsteps, but a global Muslim community that will light the torch of moderation and wisdom and blaze a more hopeful trail. Something that will offer recourse to the "gain at all costs" philosophy that has been brought on by materialist philosophy.

>> Chinese economy is growing and the Chinese are a pragmatic people, so when they see the importance of Chinese/Muslim-world relation and Xinjiang's negative effect on this relation, they will mend their ways and give Uighur's more freedom to practice and safeguard..

The situation is far more complex than this and the pragmatism of the communist regime is alot more acidic than you imagine.